Introduction
Reported interference with the functions of the National Prosecuting Authority For the purposes of this article a few cases 5 have been selected to illustrate how political events may endanger judicial independence, on the one hand, and the authoritative sway court judgments can wield in the political arena, on the other hand. At the outset the article explores the extent to which political forces endeavoured to weaken the stature of the courts as the Zuma saga unfolded, through the use of sustained pejorative rhetoric and the mobilisation of civil society.
It argues that notwithstanding the methods used by some political groups to undermine the separation of powers, it was a judicial decision that lent credence to the eventual outcome. In juxtaposition to this, other cases illustrate that lately the courts appear to be interfering with executive authority, treading on the boundaries of separation of powers.
While the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter on the constitutionality of conduct, this article reveals that the supremacy of the Constitution does not provide a cocoon within which the judiciary operates, unaffected by political events. The immense powers afforded the judiciary may be effectively exercised only while society retains respect for the integrity of the courts. A judiciary constantly depicted as a yet to be transformed remnant of the apartheid past is left vulnerable to attempts by the executive to fetter its powers. In response, attempting to rein in executive authority through law, the judiciary appears to have overstepped the boundaries of separation of powers. The crucial question is whether the inroads of the courts into the constitutional powers of other functionaries may validate the accusation that the judiciary is complicit in "a minority tyranny that is using state institutions to undermine democratic processes". 
The doctrine of separation of powers and the need to maintain judicial legitimacy
The doctrine of separation of powers refers to the distinct functions given to the three organs of state concerning the exercise of governing power. 7 The legislature makes law, the judiciary interprets the law, and the executive must implement the law. 8 A complete separation of powers between the organs of state is unattainable, because the legislature enacts legislation in terms of which the courts must operate and the executive formulates policy on the implementation priorities, along with being tasked to enforce court judgments. 9 Also embedded in the doctrine is the principle of checks and balances which accommodates the "unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the terrain of another" in order to prevent misuses of power. 10 Langa CJ confirmed that:
It is a necessary component of the doctrine of separation of powers that courts have a constitutional obligation to ensure that the exercise of power by other branches of government occurs within constitutional bounds. But even in these circumstances, courts must observe the limits of their powers.
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Judges are not elected democratically and, as Rosenberg observes, because the judiciary does not have to account to an electorate it enjoys some measure of insulation from the political process when fulfilling its constitutional mandate. 12 The notion of judicial independence thus aims to forestall overt government influence on the judiciary. 13 It means to ensure that the judiciary makes decisions in accordance with the rule of law and the requirements of justice. 14 The judiciary relies on the other organs of state, which are accountable to the citizenry, for ensuring obedience to and enforcement of the law. The court is therefore inclined to take the politics surrounding an issue into consideration to determine whether its ruling will be obeyed. 15 While "contemporary attitudes within society" evinced in political discourse may be relevant, the task of the court is to deliver unbiased adjudication. 16 Political considerations should be "at the peripherynot the core -of the judicial process". 17 Invariably the duty of the courts is to give effect to the rule of law in a manner consistent with constitutional prescripts.
Albie Sachs cautions against a judiciary that is remote from the society it serves and advocates "a judiciary that evolves to inhabit the world as it is". 18 At all times the court must be aware of the dominant opinions of the society over which it presides and balance this with its constitutional mandate. 19 What is expected is that decisions of court be "minimally affected" by the politics of the day. 20 When courts are drawn into the political arena, they should take cognisance of the opposing political interests and weigh them in the light of dominant public opinion in order to maintain relevance and legitimacy. 21 This should not unduly affect the impartiality of the adjudicative process.
In constitutional democracies, the interpretation of rights made by the courts prevails and is often given greater stature than that of the political community. 
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Threats to the independence of the judiciary
Proposed legal measures
The legal and political happenings surrounding the levelling of corruption charges against Jacob Zuma coincided with several measures proposed by the executive, in an effort to alter the demographically unrepresentative composition of the judiciary.
As early as 2003, the executive and the judiciary were thrashing out appropriate measures for achieving a transformed judiciary, with the executive proposing measures that would effectively inhibit the independence of the courts and increase executive control. 29 On the 8 th of January 2005, then President Mbeki in an address remarked as follows:
[W]e are confronted by the ... important challenge to transform the collective mind set of the judiciary to bring it into consonance with the vision and aspirations of the millions who engaged in the struggle to liberate our country from white minority domination. The reality can no longer be avoided that many within our judiciary cannot see themselves as being part of these masses, accountable to them . 
Political methods employed
The pending prosecution of Mr Zuma was politicised to such an extent that even the courts, where much of the fracas took place, were indicted as having a partisan interest when deciding the outcome. In this instance the court served as a theatre for political strife. 37 During the heated exchange of opinions, the integrity of the court could not remain unscathed -whatever decision it reached. When decisions were out of favour with the popular mind-set the reputation of the courts became even more precarious. subjected to a "trial by the media," a conviction by proxy through his association with Mr Shaik. 42 The judiciary was criticised by COSATU and the ANC Youth League respectively in the following manner:
... the trial of Shabir Shaik was nothing but a political trial of the Deputy President in absentia. The choice of a long retired judge who is a former Justice Minister of the then Rhodesia indicates the extent to which the country have not succeeded to transform its judicial system.
... we have come to the conclusion that the judge himself, by unduly pronouncing on the guiltiness of the Deputy President in his absentia, is in fact issuing a political verdict.
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The reference to Judge Squires' position as Minister of Justice in Rhodesia depicted the learned judge as a colonial relic whose judgment was premised on an exploitative and racist mentality; the implication being that lack of transformation had rendered the South African courts much the same. 44 Shortly after the Shaik conviction, Mr Zuma was in fact charged with a number of corruption-related charges. However, the relentless criticism which followed the Shaik conviction fuelled suspicions that Mr Zuma could not be afforded a fair trial before South Africa's judiciary in its current form. The next court ruling which significantly affected the political tide was issued by judge Msimang.
Political undertone in dismissal of charges fuels the narrative
In September 2006, following a request by the state for a postponement of the hearing of charges against Mr Zuma, the Natal Provincial Division (as it then was)
per Msimang J struck the corruption case off the court roll. In doing so, Judge
Msimang noted that the "struggle credentials" of Mr Zuma were "legendary and impeccable," ensuring that he was "respected and idolised" by a significant portion of the community. 45 This apparently reverent attitude towards Mr Zuma contradicts the notion that "litigants, irrespective of their status," are viewed as having equal status before the courts. 46 The court bemoaned the fact that the prejudice suffered by Mr Zuma caused by the negative publicity "engendered" by his prosecution resembled:
... the kind of punishment that ought only to be imposed on convicted persons and [the prejudice was] therefore inimical to the right to be presumed innocent enshrined in the Constitution. Malema, that he was prepared to "kill for Zuma", was followed by the COSATU general secretary announcing "for our revolution we are prepared to shoot to kill"; 54 the cumulative threat of which was aimed at putting pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution to halt the Zuma corruption proceedings.  where the faction opposed to the court has enough power to bring into being measures that curb judicial independence.
In these situations the judiciary either avoids decisions in opposition or makes a strategic retreat in the face of extreme hostility.
It was just such a "climate of menace" which prevailed in the days leading to the In that Zuma was not given the opportunity to make representations to the NPA before the decision was taken to launch a prosecution.
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Criticism of this doctrine of jurisdictional facts used by the court is that it permits courts to increase their review powers at will -Klaaren and Roux 2010 J Afr L 147.
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being made. 66 The press statement referred to as the invitation includes the following:
We have never asked for nor sought mediation. We do not need mediation ... However, we have no objection to people making representations to us, be it in respect of prosecutions or investigations. In terms of section 22(4)(c) of the Act, we are bound to consider representations.
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The court held that this was a promise, "a solemn undertaking" to consider representations, which was never withdrawn. 68 Furthermore, according to Nicholson J the statement also amounted to an invitation which afforded the applicant a legitimate expectation to make representations which the NDPP told the applicant he (the NDPP) was duty bound to consider. 69
Under the guise of evaluating the legitimacy of the expectation of the applicant to be heard by the NPA, the court embarked on an exploration of the background and context in which the decisions whether or not to prosecute the applicant were made. 70 In reality, the court recounted events which in its view were spearheaded by the executive branch of government and amounted to deliberate compromising of the independence of the NPA. Nicholson J departed from the issues placed before him for determination and proceeded to make judicial findings upon the politics surrounding the charging of Mr Zuma. In doing so, the learned judge made it clear which side of the "titanic political struggle between the applicant and the President" 71 was favoured by the court.
The court made a number of findings in order to buttress its conclusion of executive interference aimed at the political castration of Mr Zuma. legal tactics to delay his prosecution, Mr Zuma had finally succeeded in obtaining judicial backing for the claim that his prosecution was a political persecution.
There is no measurable divide between law and politics such that a court judgment can be entirely devoid of political considerations. 83 Rather, there is a continuum along which decisions range, from complete disregard of political preferences to total subservience to them. That said, the Nicholson judgment was short on evidence and legal justification for its findings of political interference in the legal process, as described above. Klareen and Roux warn that this type of partisan activist judgment, a dramatic attempt to restore the sagging reputations of the court, in fact damages the reputation of political neutrality that is necessary for the courts. 84 Matshiqi echoes this sentiment, pointing out that caving in to political pressure could do "irreparable harm to the independence and integrity of our judicial system" 85 and sets a dangerous precedent; the message being that political demands backed by the threat of mass dissent in civil society holds sway with the courts.
Aftermath of the judgment
The Nicholson judgment set in motion the ousting of former president Mbeki as president of the country, and effectively positioned Mr Zuma as president in waiting.
It gave a judicial stamp of approval, in other words legitimacy, to the ANC decision to recall Mr Mbeki, effectively ending any significant opposition to Mr Zuma's ascension to the presidency. Even with an appeal pending, it was patently obvious that the Nicholson judgment had ended any hope of prosecuting Mr Zuma prior to the April 2009 election. For this reason, it is arguable that this judgment marks a 81 Matshiqi 2007 http://www.csvr.org.za/archive/index.php/publications/1512-undamaged-reputations-implications-for-the-south-african-criminal-justice-system-of-the-allegations-against-andprosecution-of-jacob-zuma.html 8.
82
The term was coined from the Russian defence of the German siege of the city during World War II and refers to a strategy of wearing down your opponent by tenaciously fighting anything presented by whatever means available; Southall "Zunami!" 4. The manner in which the Jacob Zuma corruption saga unfolded is only one facet of a continuing struggle for supremacy between political forces and the rule of law under the constitutional dispensation. In this instance, under pressure, the judiciary traversed the limits of separation of powers in a manner that affected the trajectory of political events. 90 Clearly, judges are not entirely divorced from the practical realities of life in South Africa. Perhaps the more pragmatic view of the Nicholson judgment would be that it demonstrated that the marshalled forces of the masses in favour of a Zuma presidency in the run-up to national elections could not be ignored by dogmatic adherence to the legal process. The criminal justice system, somewhat blemished, had to yield in order that it could live to fight another day. 91 Indeed, in the aftermath the enacted legal amendments did not drastically curtail the powers and functions of the courts. Rather, the judiciary has been able to expand its powers of review, allowing it to intrude on the discretionary exercise of executive power on the appointment of the NDPP.
6
Judicial review of exercise of public power affecting the NPA Judicial review of the exercise of discretionary executive functions stems from the notion that within a constitutional structure "there is no such thing as absolute untrammelled 'discretion'". 92 In terms of the rule of law, a discretion must be exercised in accordance with legal principles. While courts will ordinarily defer to expertise and the wide ranging factors considered by functionaries, discretion must be exercised "in a manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature". 93 The principle of legality, a component of the rule of law, 94 has become a method of subjecting to judicial scrutiny the exercise of executive power which does not amount to administrative action in terms of the law. In terms of this principle the exercise of public power must not be arbitrary or exhibit preferences that cannot be equated to a legitimate government purpose, for this does not accord with the constitutional framework within which it must operate. 95 Any decisions made must therefore be rationally connected to the purpose for which the power was given. 96 In Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa, 97 the court considered the boundaries of judicial review of an executive decision within the framework of constitutional supremacy. In this matter the Democratic Alliance challenged the decision of the state president to appoint Menzi Simelane as NDPP, an executive act, as being irrational, based on the principle of legality which derives from the rule of law.
The Constitutional court set about determining the ambit of an enquiry into the rationality of the exercise of public power in terms of the principle of legality. The two-stage enquiry considers whether the power or conduct...
(1) serves a legitimate government purpose -the "purpose requirement" and (2) in fact serves that purpose in a constitutionally permissible manner, adhering to the standard of rationality -the "effect requirement". 
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In Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa the constitutional court again considered the scope of the rationality review of executive conduct. At stake was the rationality of the decision by the president to appoint Menzi Simelane as NDDP without first considering evidence of his duplicity. Yacoob ADCJ confirmed the earlier finding in Albutt that "both the process by which the decision is made and the decision itself must be rational". 101 The learned judge declared:
Not only the decision employed to achieve the purpose, but also everything done in the process of taking that decision, constitute means towards the attainment of the purpose for which the power was conferred.
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The court held that the qualifications for suitability to hold the position of NDPP (laid out in section 9(1)(b) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998), which include honesty and conscientiousness among others, were objectively ascertainable. 103 Therefore, a failure to take into account evidence relevant to the integrity of Mr Simelane amounted to irrationality, since the empowering provision required that the national director have integrity so as "to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the office concerned". 104 In effect, the reach of judicial review based on the principle of legality was expanded to include failure to take account of relevant factors; yet another example of aspects formerly confined to assessing administrative action in terms of PAJA being added to the rationality enquiry. 105
Of concern is the statement of the court that the judicial review of executive conduct on the basis of rationality does not impinge on separation of powers. Invalidating the conduct of the president in exercising his duties in terms of section 179(1)(a) of the Constitution is a patent encroachment of the judiciary on the functions of the head of the executive. The power to appoint a national director of public prosecutions has been conferred on the president alone. The rationale for allowing the judicial review of executive action was premised on narrow parameters where the exercise of power was deemed to be arbitrary and mala fides. It is within these boundaries that the court ought to justify making any inroads into the exercise of power conferred on the president. In this instance the court added to the legal requirements that satisfy legality in order to justify its findings.
PAJA bars the review among other things of certain executive actions by administrative law review. The common law power of review based on legality appears to be evolving in a manner that circumvents the prohibitions set by the legislature through expanding the scope of the rationality enquiry to include classic administrative law factors. Contrary to the prescripts of the rule of law, the court is expanding its mandate to include an oversight function on the discretionary exercise of public power in a manner which has been explicitly prohibited by PAJA. Neither the Constitution nor PAJA envisages the situation where the court may routinely veto an exercise of discretion by the designated functionary. The purpose was not to permit executive powers to be exercised with the concurrence of the judiciary nor should constitutional supremacy morph to judicial supremacy. 108 The law is structured to facilitate the judicial review of executive power only on the narrow parameters laid out by the principle of legality. As seen in the earlier judgments discussed, the belief that judges are removed from the political process is incorrect and misleading. Judicial appointments themselves have overt political undertones. 109 The influence of the changing mores of the community can be seen in judicial decisions just as in other public institutions. 110
Before a final determination is made by the apex court a matter will ordinarily have been considered by lower courts allowing at times for a diversity of conflicting legal views. Unfortunately, it is not necessarily the case that the decision that holds sway and galvanises political change is correct, therefore a desire to educate society on the part of the judiciary ought not to be seen as entirely apposite.
While it is desirable that the arbitrary exercise of power be constrained through judicial review, a unilateral bestowal of power which has been specifically withheld by the legislature does not accord with our constitutional matrix. The legislature through PAJA places designated executive conduct outside the ambit of administrative law regulation. The adjudicative function of the courts must operate in terms of the enacted national legislation. In effect the current development of a system of review for legality by our courts has created a parallel legal process comprised in essence of evolving judge-made law. Whenever the court deems it necessary and requires justification to restrain the exercise of public power this law is expanded and increasing factors are being attributed to the rationality enquiry.
The ever-present fear that the court may "stray too far into the legitimate constitutional spheres of the executive and legislative branches of government" 111 was actualised in the decision of Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public
Prosecutions (hereafter FUL v NDPP). 112
In FUL v NDPP the court was petitioned to review and set aside the decisions of the NPA and to direct the NPA to reinstate some withdrawn criminal charges. The Constitutional Court has stated that "the prosecuting authority is not part of the judiciary" and that in order to ensure sufficient independence national law was to be 109 Daniels "Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty" 6. crafted in a manner that facilitated the exercise of its mandate "without fear, favour or prejudice". 113 Thus, the judiciary has not been assigned the task of determining whether or not to initiate or withdraw pending prosecutions. In practice the judicial review of prosecutorial discretion must therefore be "a highly exceptional remedy". 114 According to Lord Bingham [t] he reasons why the courts are very slow to interfere are well understood. They are, first, that the powers in question are entrusted to the officers identified, and to no one else. No other authority may exercise these powers or make the judgments on which such exercise must depend. Secondly, the courts have recognised ... "the polycentric character of official decision-making in such matters including policy and public interest considerations which are not susceptible of judicial review because it is within neither the constitutional function not the practical competence of the courts to assess their merits".
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The intervention of the court in prosecutorial functions is limited also in order to safeguard the independence of the NPA. 116 The court in FUL v NDPP alluded to the fact that in terms of South African law a breach of the principle of legality, on which judicial review of prosecutorial discretion rests, may occur where there was an improper exercise (illegal and irrational), mala fides or decisions based on ulterior purposes. 117 The learned judge erroneously dissociated a decision to discontinue prosecution from a decision to prosecute, 118 and therefore held that PAJA was applicable to the case at hand. The learned judge then characterised calls for judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion as "misplaced". 119 The court ultimately concluded that the NDPP did not exercise her The high court reviewed and set aside decisions of prosecutors subordinate to the NDPP and went further, ordering the reinstatement of charges along with expeditious prosecutions. 122 That the court was unhappy with what it determined to be the NDPP's "supine" attitude was no licence to pre-judge that referral to the national director would be a foregone conclusion. 123 If indeed the circumstances of this particular matter were such that the NDPP ought to have applied her mind and provided the requested reasons for the failure to intervene, it was the duty of the court to direct that the NDPP apply her mind in the manner required. Once the discretion had been exercised by the NDPP, the court would then have the authority to determine whether or not the decision (on whether or not to intervene or review the prosecutorial decisions made) was rational in terms of the principle of legality. The court traversed the boundaries of separation of powers by usurping the powers of the prosecution. The adjudicative function of the court is restricted to determining whether a public power is exercised in terms of the rule of law. Once this has been pronounced upon, the court is not at liberty to cloak itself with that power and determine how the discretion of another functionary should be exercised and then order that office to act in the manner desired by the court. On appeal the SCA affirmed that the doctrine of separation of powers had been violated by the court a quo. 124 However the SCA remained uncomplimentary of the inaction of the NDPP in the face of wide-spread media coverage of the dispute relating to the withdrawal of charges, prior to the FUL application. 125 Thus the characterisation of the NDPP of irresponsibly abdicating her constitutional responsibilities remains.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to consider some instances where the judiciary may have crossed the boundaries of separation of powers. At the outset it was clear that NPA credibility has been compromised by interference with its independent exercise of power. Rather than considering the role of political forces, the focus was on the interference of the judiciary. Specific court judgments relating to NPA operations and conduct were analysed to determine whether or not the judiciary had acted improperly.
High-profile corruption charges levelled against Jacob Zuma were used to demonstrate the political minefield the court has to navigate at times in order to sustain or repair its integrity. The events and cases examined show that there is no finite divide between law and politics. The methods employed in order to persuade courts to align judicial decisions with the dominant political sentiments placed the legal process and the rule of law in peril. Ultimately, the court departed from its mandate, audaciously crossing into the political arena, and defused the threat. In so doing, the court made a finding of habitual meddling in the functioning of the NPA, thus further blighting the repute of the NPA. While the decision was overturned on appeal its effect on subsequent developments was not. The SCA declaration that the 124 NDPP v FUL para 51.
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alleged executive interference with the NPA was not an issue before the court a quo did not restore NPA credibility.
The court then considered if the executive power to appoint the NDPP had been properly exercised by President Zuma. In order to facilitate a review of the decision in terms of the principle of legality, the court opted to extend the ambit of the rationality enquiry to include failure to take account of relevant factors. By doing this the court extended its powers of review in a manner that was withheld by the legislature. Essentially the court violated separation of powers by operating outside of the parameters set by the law (in terms of PAJA). Furthermore, regardless of whether or not it was justified, judicial interference with the appointment of a NDPP contributed to the disgrace of the NPA.
Finally, in FUL v NDPP the court declared that the outcry from certain quarters should have prompted the NDPP to exercise a discretionary review power and therefore concluded that the NDPP had failed to conduct her duties in a responsible manner. The prosecution and the judiciary have separate spheres of operation which have been enunciated in the Constitution. It is not desirable that the court direct the NDPP on which circumstances should elicit a response from the NDPP. As discussed above, the decisions of prosecution often require a systemic view of interrelated variables. Having proclaimed the NDPP irresponsible and essentially spineless, the court seized the power of the NDPP and exercised it itself. While the SCA overturned the mandatory interdicts (to reinstate withdrawn charges) it repeated criticism of the inaction of the NDPP in the face of negative publicity. Because of the statements in these judgments the already tarnished image of the NPA deteriorated even further.
This article has revealed that courts are not immune from politics and at times judges have to make decisions which affect political processes in a significant way.
The cases discussed demonstrate that when confronted with such issues courts have not been reluctant to extend the boundaries of their authority in order to dispense justice. Principled as this stance may be, it does not always accord with the prescripts of the doctrine of separation of powers under our constitutional legal framework. Therefore, while attempting to restrain unjustifiable exercises of executive power, the judiciary has unwittingly contributed to the damage brought about. 
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